Spatial Competition and Cross-border Shopping: Evidence from State Lotteries by Brian G. Knight & Nathan Schiff
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
SPATIAL COMPETITION AND CROSS-BORDER SHOPPING:









We thank EeCheng Ong for careful research assistance and Bo Zhao and Tom Garrett for helpful comments
on the paper. We acknowledge support from the New England Public Policy Center at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Brian G. Knight and Nathan Schiff. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Spatial Competition and Cross-border Shopping: Evidence from State Lotteries
Brian G. Knight and Nathan Schiff




This paper investigates competition between jurisdictions in the context of cross-border shopping for
state lottery tickets. We first develop a simple theoretical model in which consumers choose between
state lotteries and face a trade-off between travel costs and the price of a fair gamble, which is declining
in the size of the jackpot and the odds of winning. Given this trade-off, the model predicts that per-resident
sales should be more responsive to prices in small states with densely populated borders, relative to
large states with sparsely populated borders. Our empirical analysis focuses on the multi-state games
of Powerball and Mega Millions, and the identification strategy is based upon high-frequency variation
in prices due to the rollover feature of lottery jackpots. The empirical results support the predictions
of the model. The magnitude of these effects is large, suggesting that states do face competitive pressures
from neighboring lotteries, but the effects vary significantly across states.
Brian G. Knight
Brown University






Sauder School of Business
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
 nathan.schiff@sauder.ubc.ca1 Introduction
This paper examines competition between jurisdictions in the United States. In an analogy
to competition in the private sector, the Tiebout model (1956) demonstrates that a greater
degree of choice in the public sector enhances e￿ciency when public goods are ￿nanced via
bene￿ts taxation. In his model, tax rates serve as prices for accessing the public good, and
individuals thus sort into jurisdictions according to their preferences for public services. In a
similar vein, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argued that competition between governments
may help to constrain Leviathan governments whose sole objective is to maximize revenue.
In this case, competition in the public sector serves to reduce the size of the public sector
and hence enhance economic e￿ciency from the perspective of taxpayers. A key assumption
in this literature is that individuals respond to di￿erences in tax and spending policies across
jurisdictions when making economic decisions.
In this paper, we examine responses to policy di￿erences across jurisdictions and the
associated competition in the context of the market for lottery products in the United States.
On the one hand, competition in this market seems non-existent since every state government
has established monopoly rights over the provision of lottery games. Perhaps as a result of
this monopoly provision, states set payout rates on lottery tickets at relatively low levels,
and the implicit tax rates facing consumers are thus very high, especially when considered
relative to taxes on other commodities.
On the other hand, while state governments may have monopoly rights over the provision
of lottery products within their state boundaries, competition across states boundaries may
be signi￿cant. In particular, consumers, especially those living near borders, are often willing
to cross into other states in order to play lottery games, and the existence of lotteries in
nearby states may thus provide an important form of competition in this market. If such
competition is economically signi￿cant, then the introduction of lotteries in new states may
reduce lottery sales in nearby states with existing lotteries.
In theory, state governments may respond to this competition from neighboring state
lotteries in a variety of ways. One possibility is that they will respond by decreasing implicit
tax rates, a hypothesis supported by Brown and Rork (2005). Alternatively, states may
attempt to collude via the coordination of lottery games across states. Recent decades have
witnessed an explosion in the sales of these coordinated multi-state games, most prominently
Powerball and Mega Millions.
In order to measure the degree of competition facing state lotteries, this paper uses
several insights regarding where and when cross-border shopping should be most prevalent.
Regarding where, anecdotal evidence suggests that cross-border shopping is most common
1along densely populated borders between states that are not coordinating their lottery games.
For example, many New Yorkers, who cannot purchase Powerball tickets within their state
boundaries, reportedly cross the Connecticut border, which is just outside of the densely
populated New York City, in order to purchase Powerball tickets. Regarding when, anecdotal
evidence suggests that cross-border shopping is most likely when jackpots are high. That is,
the crossing of New Yorkers into Connecticut was particularly salient when the Powerball
jackpot reached $250 million in 1998.1 Put together, this anecdotal evidence suggests
that the relationship between lottery sales and lottery jackpots may be stronger in densely
populated areas that do not share a multi-state game than in sparsely populated areas or
along borders cooperating in the same multi-state lottery.
In this paper, we begin by formalizing these ideas in a simple theoretical model of the
choices facing lottery players. In the model, players face a trade-o￿ between travel distance
and the price of a fair gamble, which is declining in the size of the jackpot and in the odds of
winning. Given this trade-o￿, the model predicts that, if cross-border shopping is substantial,
then the relationship between sales and prices should be stronger in states that have small
populations and densely populated border regions, such as Rhode Island and Delaware, than
in states that have large populations and more rural border regions, such as California and
Texas.
In order to test this hypothesis, our empirical application focuses on the large multi-
state games of Powerball and Mega Millions. We combine information from several di￿erent
datasets. The ￿rst dataset consists of weekly lottery sales between 1995 and 2008 for each
state and separately for each game. The second dataset represents game characteristics, most
notably odds and jackpots on a drawing-by-drawing basis for Powerball and Mega Millions.
The fact that jackpots roll over to the next drawing in the event that a winning ticket is not
purchased provides a source of variation in jackpots and thus in prices across games and over
time. The third dataset includes information on the spatial distribution of the population in
the United States in 2000 and is used to create measures of the size of the population living
near every state border.
The empirical results support the theoretical predictions. Lottery sales per capita are
higher during weeks with large jackpots, which imply low prices. Importantly, this relation-
ship is much stronger in states with small populations and densely populated border regions
than in states with large populations and sparsely populated border regions. The results
demonstrate that cross-border sales are an economically signi￿cant factor in small, densely
populated states. In a series of alternative speci￿cations, we then examine the robustness of
1 New York Times, July 27, 1998.
2these results. As predicted by the theory, we also show in a placebo test that these relation-
ships are not present along borders in which both states participate in the same interstate
lottery game since there is no incentive to cross state borders in this case. Finally, we use the
model to predict how sales would change were Powerball and Mega Millions tickets available
in every state.
Our approach o￿ers several contributions to the literature on cross-border shopping for
lottery tickets. First, our paper develops a theoretical framework for investigating cross-
border shopping that incorporates the spatial distribution of the population. This structure
yields two new insights for measuring cross-border shopping: border shopping is more likely
in areas with densely populated border regions, and lottery players are more likely to cross
borders when jackpots are sizeable. Our other contributions are empirical but are based
upon these theoretical insights. In particular, our study is unique in using data on the spatial
distribution of the population in order to identify where border shopping is most relevant.
Other studies have tended to assume that the e￿ects of lotteries in neighboring states on
revenues are homogenous across the United States and have thus ignored these substantial
di￿erences in the spatial distribution of the population across states. In addition, we are the
￿rst to use high-frequency variation in the jackpot size over time to estimate the degree of
cross-border shopping. Other studies have tended to use annual data and thus ignore this
source of signi￿cant variation in the desirability of lottery products over time and across
states.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by providing background information on state
lotteries. We then discuss the relevant literature. This discussion is followed by the pre-
sentation of our theoretical model and its key predictions. After describing the data, we
present our baseline empirical results and robustness tests. The ￿nal section discusses policy
implications and concludes.
2 Background on state lotteries
This section provides a brief background on state lotteries with a focus on those issues that
are most relevant to cross-border shopping and competition between states. See Clotfelter
et al. (1999) and Kearney (2005) for more complete information on state lotteries.
In 1964, New Hampshire became the ￿rst state government in the United States to op-
erate a lottery. Many states followed suit, and, by 2007, 42 state lotteries were in operation.
Lottery tickets must be purchased from licensed retailers, which operate only within state
boundaries.2 Thus, individuals wishing to purchase lottery tickets out of state must physi-
2 Prior to 1985, six states were o￿ering lottery tickets to out-of-state players via mail, a practice that
3cally travel to a licensed retailer in that state.
Every state in the continental United States currently either has a lottery or is bordered
by at least one state with a lottery. Given this widespread availability, lotteries have become
the most common form of gambling. According to a recent Gallup survey, almost one-half of
respondents reported that they had purchased a state lottery ticket in the preceding year.3
Regarding the overall size of the market, lottery revenues in 2007 totaled $76 billion
nationwide. In terms of the disposition of these revenues, $56 billion were paid out in prizes,
$18 billion were retained by states as pro￿ts, and the remaining $2 billion were attributed
to administrative expenses.4 With roughly 230 million U.S. residents over the age of 18,
which is a typical minimum age for purchasing lottery tickets, this implies per capita annual
purchases of $330. The 24 percent pro￿t margin is consistent with an implicit commodity
tax rate of 32 percent, which, while lower than in past years, remains much higher than tax
rates on other products (Clotfelter and Cook, 1990).
A variety of games are currently available to lottery players. In the lotto game, which is
the focus of this paper, players choose a series of numbers, such as ￿ve numbers between 1
and 59 and one number between 1 and 39 in Powerball, and win the jackpot if their numbers
match those chosen at the drawing.5 If there is no winning ticket, the jackpot rolls over to
the next drawing, and there are typically two drawings per week. In this type of game, the
odds are long but, because of the rollover feature, jackpots can grow very large.
Due in part to demand for games with large jackpots, some states have banded together
to form multi-state games. In 1987, the District of Columbia and ￿ve relatively small states,
Iowa, Kansas, Oregon, Rhode Island, and West Virginia, formed the Multi-State Lottery
Association, which o￿ered a lottery game known as LottoAmerica. In 1992, the Association
began the Powerball lotto game, which quickly grew in popularity due to its large jackpots.
As shown in Table 1, there was signi￿cant entry into Powerball during our sample period
was declared illegal by the U.S. Postal Service on May 31, 1985 (Washington Post, June 1, 1985). Similar
legal issues apply to potential internet sales of lottery tickets to out-of-state players. Relatedly, the reselling
of tickets in out-of-state retail outlets is typically illegal. During a large Powerball jackpot in 1993, some
Massachusetts retail outlets were selling Powerball tickets originally purchased in Rhode Island, an act that
violated Massachusetts law (Boston Globe, July 8, 1993).
3 These data were taken from the website http://www.gallup.com/poll/104086/one-six-americans-gamble-
sports.aspx (accessed August 5, 2009).
4 These data are taken from the Census Bureau 2007 Survey of Governments.
5 Lottery games can be placed into several broad categories (Clotfelter et al., 1999). In addition to the
lotto, there are four other categories of games. Instant scratch tickets allow the player to immediately observe
and collect any prizes. In the numbers game, players choose their own three-digit or four-digit numbers and
win if their numbers match those chosen during the drawing, which are typically held daily. Keno is a similar
game but one in which drawings are held more frequently, often hourly. Video lottery terminals are similar
to those found in casinos and o￿er games such as video poker.
41995-2008. By the end of this period, Powerball tickets were sold in D.C. and in 30 states.
As also shown in Table 1, six states came together in 1996 to start a competitor multi-state
lottery known as The Big Game. In 2002, the name was changed to Mega Millions, and, by
the end of 2008, tickets were sold in 12 of the 13 lottery states not currently selling Powerball
tickets. Florida entered Mega Millions in 2009, and every lottery state thus currently partic-
ipates in either Powerball or Mega Millions. Jackpots in the Mega Millions game have also
grown large, with the $390 million top prize on March 6, 2007 marking the largest jackpot in
U.S. history. While jackpots tend to be large, the odds of winning are very long. The odds
of winning the jackpot in Powerball, for example, are currently 1 in 195,249,054.
In order to provide a sense of the spatial distribution of Powerball and Mega Millions
states, Figure 1 maps the membership in these two games as of December 31, 2008, the
end of our sample period. As shown, two Mega Millions states, Illinois and Washington,
are completely surrounded by states participating in the competing Powerball game. At
the other extreme, four Powerball states, North Dakota, Minnesota, Kansas, and Maine,
are completely surrounded by states cooperating in the Powerball game. Thus, there is
signi￿cant spatial variation in the degree of competition facing Powerball and Mega Millions
states.
A recent agreement between these two multi-state games will allow for the simultaneous
sale of both sets of tickets in all Powerball and Mega Millions states.6 This cross-selling of
the two lottery tickets is expected to begin in early 2010. This agreement may also reportedly
lay the foundation for the introduction of a new \national lottery" with tickets available in
all 42 states currently participating in Powerball or Mega Millions.
3 Existing literature
Our paper is most closely related to several studies that investigate cross-border shopping in
the context of lottery tickets. Garrett and Marsh (2002) use lottery sales data for counties
in Kansas during 1998 and compare sales in border counties to sales in non-border counties.
They ￿nd that Kansas counties which border states with lotteries tend to have lower sales,
while counties bordering states without lotteries tend to have higher sales.7 While this
study uses only cross-sectional variation across counties, Tosun and Skidmore (2004) use
annual lottery sales for counties in West Virginia between 1987 and 2000. Variation across
time in the introduction of lottery games in border states allows the authors to control for
6 Philadelphia Inquirer, October 14, 2009.
7 They control for both county demographic characteristics and spatial autocorrelation.
5county ￿xed e￿ects. The key ￿ndings are that sales in border counties decline following the
introduction of new lottery games in bordering states. Mikesell (1991) conducts a telephone
survey and estimates the determinants of lottery expenditure in Indiana before the Indiana
State Lottery was introduced and thus all expenditures were out of state. The key ￿nding
here is that Indiana residents living in border counties were more likely to play the lottery.
Two studies use national data on cross-border lottery shopping. Stover (1990) uses sales
data from 1984 and 1985 for the 17 states with lotteries in these years and ￿nds that sales
are in￿uenced by lottery status in neighboring states. While this study is limited to just 34
observations, Walker and Jackson (2008) use a longer panel covering the period 1985 to 2000.
They thus use variation across time in the introduction of lotteries in bordering states and
show that lottery sales are declining in the fraction of bordering states with a lottery. One
limitation of these studies involves strategic entry, under which states may choose to adopt
lotteries when demand for these products is high. Our study, by contrast, uses variation in
jackpots over time for a given con￿guration of state lotteries and is thus less a￿ected by this
issue of strategic entry.
More generally, our paper is related to a literature on the economics of state lotteries. This
literature has focused on issues such as the regressivity of the implicit tax on lottery products
(Oster, 2004), the budget impact of the earmarking of lottery revenues for education (Evans
and Zhang, 2007), the e￿ects of lottery purchases on overall consumption (Kearney, 2002a),
and the e￿ect of selling a winning ticket on retailer sales of lottery tickets in subsequent
drawings (Guryan and Kearney, 2008). See Clotfelter and Cook (1990) and Kearney (2005)
for a more complete review of the literature.
There is also a large related literature on cross-border shopping in other contexts.8 Using
individual-level data and spatial analysis, Lovenheim (2008) ￿nds that price elasticities for
cigarettes vary with the distance that individuals must travel to a state with lower prices.
Like us, Beard et al. (1997) build a theoretical model of cross-border shopping. They
estimate the model using data on alcohol sales and taxes at the state level and ￿nd evidence
of cross-border shopping for beer but not for liquor. Asplund et al. (2007) examine liquor
sales in Swedish municipalities and ￿nd that price elasticities are decreasing in the distance
to the border with Denmark. Using data from the states of Illinois and Indiana, Doyle and
Samphantharak (2008) ￿nds that gasoline taxes are largely incorporated into gasoline prices,
but that this relationship between taxes and prices depends upon the distance to the state
border. Finally, Goolsbee (2000) shows that consumers are more likely to purchase goods
8 There is a related literature in industrial organization on spatial competition between ￿rms. For example,
Davis (2006) estimates a model in which spatially dispersed consumers choose between products that are
characterized by their location. In an empirical application to movie theaters, one interesting ￿nding is that
travel costs have an estimated shape that is concave in nature.
6via the internet if their state of residence has higher sales tax rates.
Related to this literature on cross-border shopping, there is also a literature on spatial
interdependence in policies across jurisdictions. In the context of lotteries, Brown and Rork
(2005) ￿nd that neighboring states respond to changes in lottery payout rates. Case et al.
(1993) show that a one dollar increase in government spending leads to a 70 cent increase in
spending by neighboring states. Using data from the Boston metropolitan area, Brueckner
and Saavedra (2001) show that municipalities engage in strategic property tax competition.
The analysis of Besley and Case (1995) provides empirical support for yardstick competi-
tion, under which voters evaluate incumbent governors by comparing tax policy to that in
neighboring states. For a more complete review of this literature, see Brueckner (2003).
4 Conceptual framework
In this section, we develop a simple two-state model in order to illustrate our main empirical
approach to identifying cross-border shopping. Given our empirical motivation, we keep the
model simple and make speci￿c functional form assumptions in some cases. It should be
clear, however, that the results are robust to more general economic environments. Also,
given our empirical application, we focus on the market for lottery products. The basic
trade-o￿ between travel costs and prices, however, is more general and applies to many other
forms of commodity taxation.
4.1 Setup
In the model, player i chooses to play one of two possible state lotteries, which are given by
West (W) and East (E) and are indexed by s. Conditional on choosing to play lottery s,
individual i must choose how many tickets to purchase (xis), each of which returns a jackpot
js with probability ps:9 Players are characterized by their geographic locations (li), which
are assumed to be distributed on the interval [0;L] according to the distribution function F.
The border between the states is located at b, and players with li < b are thus residents of
state W and players with li > b are thus residents of state E. The total number of residents
is normalized to one, with a fraction NE living in state E and a fraction NW = 1￿NE living
in state W. Thus, we have that F(b) = NW:
9 Note that this model makes two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that there is at most one
winner of the jackpot. In reality, there are sometimes multiple winners who split the jackpot. Incorporating
this factor would signi￿cantly complicate the analysis since it would introduce strategic interactions between
players. Second, we assume that there is only one prize available, the jackpot. In reality, lotto games tend
to have multiple prizes with smaller prizes available for matching a subset of the numbers drawn. This
assumption is motivated by our empirical strategy, which focuses on variation in the size of the jackpot over
time due to rollovers of previous jackpots without a winning ticket.
7In order for individual i to play the lottery in the state where he is not a resident, he
must travel a distance to the border equal to di = jli ￿ bj, and the marginal cost of such
travel is given by c: Thus, total transportation costs associated with playing the lottery in
neighboring states is given by cdi:10 Players choosing to play the home lottery are assumed
to have immediate access to a retail store and thus face no transportation costs.
Following Kearney (2002b), we also assume that players receive an entertainment value
from playing the lottery.11 We model this entertainment aspect by the function g(xis);
which is assumed to be homogenous across players and is increasing in the number of tickets
purchased but at a decreasing rate. That is, g0(xis) > 0 and g00(xis) < 0: We normalize this
function such that g(0) = 0 and also assume that g0(0) > 1: The latter assumption guarantees
that individuals always prefer to participate in the domestic lottery over not participating
in any lottery.12 Finally, we assume that players are endowed with exogenous income equal
to m:
We further assume that players are risk-neutral and that, following Kearney (2002b),
utility is separable in the ￿nancial and entertainment aspects of the lottery. Under these
assumptions, player i receives the following utility from purchasing xis lottery tickets in state
s:
Uis = xisps(m + js ￿ xis ￿ cdis) + (1 ￿ xisps)(m ￿ xis ￿ cdis) + g(xis)
where dis = 0 for the home-state lottery. This can be rewritten as follows:
Uis = m ￿ cdis ￿ ￿sxis + g(xis)
where ￿s = 1 ￿ psjs can be interpreted as the price of purchasing a fair gamble, de￿ned as
one that costs $1 to play and pays an expected value of $1. Note that ￿s ￿ 1 since jackpots
cannot be negative.
10 Note that this formulation assumes that individuals travel across borders for the sole purpose of playing
lotteries. In reality, individuals may travel across the border to purchase bundles of products when tax rates
di￿er substantially across states. In this case, the total travel costs cdi will be spread across multiple products.
11 Evidence from Kearney (2002a) suggests that non-￿nancial aspects of games, which can be interpreted
as entertainment, are important determinants of sales. For example, games that require players to choose
seven digits have higher sales than games that require players to choose four digits, all else equal.
12 Below we consider the case in which only one state o￿ers a lottery, and residents of the other state must
thus travel in order to purchase lottery tickets. In this case, if the travel costs are su￿ciently high, players
may choose to not participate even under this assumption.
84.2 Individual choices
Conditional on choosing to play the lottery in state s; the number of tickets purchased by
individual i is characterized by the following ￿rst-order condition:
g0(xis) = ￿s
Thus, players equate the marginal entertainment value to the price of a fair gamble. Note that
the marginal entertainment value from a ticket must be signi￿cant in order to induce sizable
sales since prices for playing fair games are typically positive and signi￿cant. Inverting this
￿rst-order condition, we have that xis = xs = h(￿s) where h = (g0)￿1. Since h0 = 1=g00 < 0;
the number of tickets purchased is decreasing in the price of a fair gamble (￿s): Also, note
that the number of tickets is constant across individuals and is independent of the distance
traveled:13 Given these results, the indirect utility for player i choosing lottery s is given by:
Vis = m ￿ cdis + z(￿s)
where z(￿s) = g(h(￿s)) ￿ ￿sh(￿s) represents the non-travel, ￿nancial bene￿ts from playing
lottery s. Applying the envelope theorem, we have that z0(￿s) = ￿h(￿s) and thus the
non-travel, ￿nancial bene￿ts are decreasing in the price of a fair gamble (￿s):
Given these results, there exists a cuto￿ location (e l) at which residents are indi￿erent
between playing the lotteries in states E and W. This cuto￿ is given by:
e l = b + (z(￿W) ￿ z(￿E))=c
Players west of this location (li < e l) thus play lottery W, and those east of this location
(li > e l) thus play lottery E.
4.3 Lottery revenues
Lottery revenue for state W; which is the product of sales per player (xW) and the number
of players F(e l), can be written as:
RW = h(￿W)F [b + (z(￿W) ￿ z(￿E))=c]
Recalling that F(b) = NW, the log of per capita revenues (rW = RW=NW) is then given by:
ln(rW) = ln[h(￿W)] + lnF [b + (z(￿W) ￿ z(￿E))=c] ￿ ln[F(b)]
| {z }
cross-border adjustment factor
13 Note that optimal spending on lottery tickets is independent of income. While this is driven by the
fuctional form assumptions made above, it is consistent with evidence from Kearney (2005), who shows that
average spending levels are similar across di￿erent income groups.
9The ￿rst term represents log sales per player, and the second term is the cross-border adjust-
ment factor. If the price of a fair game in E is higher than that in W (￿E > ￿W), then this
cross-border adjustment factor is positive since residents from state E will cross the border
and play lottery W. Similarly, if prices are higher in state W; then this factor is negative
since residents from state W will cross the border and play lottery E.14
This model yields a number of testable hypotheses related to cross-border shopping. To
generate an empirical speci￿cation, we ￿rst take a ￿rst-order linear approximation to the
above revenues equation at the point ￿W = ￿ and ￿E = ￿:15 This yields:










where ￿ = ln[h(￿)]￿
h0(￿)
h(￿) ￿ is a constant and ￿(b) = f(b)=F(b) represents the Mills ratio, the
population density function divided by the distribution function, both of which are evaluated
at the border.
Using the fact that f(b) ￿ F(b+")￿F(b￿") for small values of "; the numerator of the
Mills ratio can be interpreted as the size of the population near the border, regardless of which
side. Since the denominator F(b) represents state population, the model thus predicts that
sales in state W are more responsive to the price of the a￿liated lottery (￿W) in states with
small populations and densely populated border regions and less responsive in states with
large populations and sparsely populated border regions. Finally, note that the magnitude
of the e￿ect is decreasing in the cost of travel (c), which makes players less willing to cross
borders.
Similarly, the model demonstrates that the relationship between sales and the price of
the rival lottery (￿E) also depends upon the Mills ratio ￿(b). Thus, sales should also be
more responsive to the price of the rival lottery in states with small populations and densely
populated border regions. Comparing the strength of the a￿liated price e￿ect and rival price
e￿ect, the former e￿ect is the stronger of the two since it also includes the term h0(￿)=h(￿),
which re￿ects the intensive margin, de￿ned as the increased sales per player induced by lower
prices. This intensive margin is not relevant for consumers who choose to play the lottery in
the competing state.
The model can also be used to consider the e￿ects of states cooperating in multi-state
games, such as Powerball and Mega Millions. In particular, if the two states are part of the
14 Analogous results can be demonstrated for revenues from state E:
15 We evaluate this function at the same prices (￿W = ￿E = ￿) for two reasons. First, it generates a
tractable empirical speci￿cation since the terms z(￿W) and z(￿E) cancel out in the key spatial expressions
f(b) and F(b). Second, equal prices will occur on average in our empirical application to follow since the two
lotteries under examination, Powerball and Mega Millions, have similar odds and both allow jackpots to roll
over to the next drawing.
10same multi-state game, then jackpots, odds, and thus prices are always identical (￿E = ￿W);
and the cross-border shopping adjustment factor vanishes since there is no incentive to travel
to neighboring states when purchasing lottery tickets. In this case, revenues are given by
ln(rW) = ln[h(￿W)] and thus increases in a￿liated prices yield decreases in sales but only due
to the decrease in sales per player for the domestic population. In particular, the relationship
between sales and both a￿liated and rival prices should not depend upon the population
density in border regions. We use this prediction to provide a placebo test of our main results
in the empirical application to follow.
Finally, we use the model to consider a scenario in which the bordering state E does not
have a lottery since this is relevant to our empirical application, in which some states do
not have lotteries. In this case, it is possible that some players in state E will prefer to not
purchase any lottery tickets if the associated travel costs are su￿ciently high. It can then be
shown that the linear approximation to revenues is given by:







where ￿ = ln[h(￿)]￿
h0(￿)
h(￿) ￿+lnF [b + (z(￿)=c)]￿ln[F(b)]:16 Thus, there are two important
di￿erences between the above case with competing lotteries and this case in which the bor-
dering state has no lottery. First, in this case, lottery revenues in state W depend only upon
the price of lottery W and thus do not depend upon the price of the rival lottery. Second, the
marginal resident is always located in state E, and thus only the population on the foreign
side of the border is relevant for cross-border shopping.
In summary, the model yields a number of testable predictions. First, lottery sales are
declining in the price of the a￿liated lottery. More importantly, this relationship is stronger
in small states, in states with densely populated borders with competing neighbors, and in
states with densely populated borders with neighbors without a lottery. Second, the positive
relationship between sales and prices of rival lotteries is stronger in small states and in those
states with densely populated borders with competing states. Third, these relationships
16 To generate this, note that there exists a cuto￿ point located in state E where players are indi￿erent
between playing the lottery in state E and not purchasing any tickets, which yields a utility level of V = m:
This cuto￿ is given by:
e l = b + z(￿W)=c
Given this cuto￿, the log of per capita revenues are thus given by:
ln(rW) = ln[h(￿W)] + lnF [b + (z(￿W)=c)] ￿ ln[F(b)]
| {z }
cross-border adjustment factor
Thus, the cross-border adjustment factor is always positive in this case.
11between sales and prices should be independent of population density along cooperating
borders, de￿ned as those in which both states participate in the same multi-state lottery.
5 Data and Empirical Framework
Since our hypotheses relate lottery sales to prices and the spatial distribution of the popula-
tion, we combine data from three di￿erent sources. In order to focus on games in which we
would expect signi￿cant cross-border shopping, we use sales data from Powerball and Mega
Millions, the two lotteries with the largest jackpots. Our data on lottery sales were provided
by La Fleur’s and include weekly sales data from 1995 to 2008 separately by game and state.
Note that states enter Powerball and Mega Millions at di￿erent points in time and thus the
panel data are unbalanced in this case.
Data on the size of the jackpot by drawing in Mega Millions between its introduction on
September 6, 1996 and the end of 2008 were downloaded from the Massachusetts Lottery
website. Drawings in this game are held every Tuesday and Friday. Similar data on the size
of the jackpot by drawing in Powerball were provided by the Multi-State Lottery Association
and begin in 1992. Drawings for this game are held every Wednesday and Saturday. Both
of these measures represent advertised jackpots, de￿ned as the forecast of the jackpot that
is communicated to potential players on the days leading up to the drawing.17
In order to measure prices, we have also collected data on the odds of winning the jackpot
in both Powerball and Mega Millions. These odds have changed somewhat over our sample
period, tending to become longer. In calculating prices, we also discounted the stream of
payments associated with winning the jackpot since the advertised jackpot is not adjusted to
re￿ect present value considerations. Finally, we incorporate federal taxes on lottery winnings
under the assumption that winning the jackpot will put the taxpayer in the highest marginal
tax bracket. The rate associated with this tax bracket has also increased somewhat over our
sample period.
Since we have two observations per week on jackpots but only one observation on sales,
we use the maximum jackpot during the week as our key measure. This follows the approach
used by Kearney (2002a). We have also experimented with using the average jackpot, and
our results are qualitatively similar to those presented here.
To measure the size of the population along state borders, we used spatial software
and 2000 Census data.18 We ￿rst compute the distance from the center of every census
17 The actual jackpot will di￿er if actual sales during the days leading up to the drawing are not equal to
projected sales.
18 Ideally, we would measure population on an annual basis during our sample period 1995-2008. The
12tract to every state border.19 This then allows us to compute measures of the size of the
population near the border for di￿erent de￿nitions of proximity. We use three such measures
of proximity, the number of residents within 25 kilometers of either side of the state border,
the number within 50 kilometers of either side of the border, and the number within 100
kilometers of either side of the border. Assuming that travel occurs on highways at a rate of
65 miles per hour and that retail stores are available directly on the border, these distances
represent one-way travel times of 14, 28, and 56 minutes, respectively. While these distances
do represent signi￿cant travel times, we have found accounts of some individuals travelling
well in excess of these three assumed distances in order to purchase lottery tickets.20
As noted above, there are three types of borders. For a state selling Powerball tickets, for
example, there are potential borders with states also selling Powerball tickets (cooperating),
with states selling Mega Millions tickets (competing), and with states selling neither type
of ticket (neither). We expect the responsiveness of sales in a given state to the price of
the a￿liated lottery to depend upon the population along both sides of the border with a
competing lottery and along the foreign side of the border for states with neither lottery. We
refer to this combined population divided by state population as the in￿ow ratio. We expect
the responsiveness of sales in a given state to the price of the rival lottery to depend upon
the population along both sides of the border with a competing lottery. We refer to this
population measure divided by state population as the out￿ow ratio.21 Thus, the di￿erence
between the in￿ow and the out￿ow ratios is due to borders with states that participate
in neither Powerball nor Mega Millions. Note that the in￿ow and the out￿ow ratios will
necessarily change as states enter and exit multi-state games, and we thus calculate these
for each of the 21 combinations of multi-state game members, as shown in Table 1, between
1995 and 2008.
Census Bureau releases annual population estimates for each state and county. These estimates, however, are
not provided for smaller census areas, such as zip codes, census tracts, block groups, and blocks. Note that
our key spatial measures, the in￿ow and out￿ow ratios, are based upon the size of the population living near
borders divided by the number of state residents. Thus, these measures are una￿ected by population growth
so long as the growth is similar in both non-border and border regions.
19 More speci￿cally, we discretize every state border into 2,500 points and then calculate the great circle
distance from the census tract centroid to the closest border point.
20 On the lottery blog http://www.lotterypost.com/topic/196525 (accessed October 28, 2009), an individual
reports traveling from Dallas, Texas to Shreveport, Louisiana, a distance of 301 kilometers, in order to purchase
Powerball tickets.
21 We calculate these populations as follows. For the domestic population in a given state, say x, we simply
compute the minimum distance to a Powerball or Mega Millions state, which could be zero for a￿liated
states, and then determine whether or not this is below the cuto￿ distance. For every tract in states other
than x, we ￿rst determine whether state x is the closest Powerball or Mega Millions state to that tract, and,
if so, whether the distance is below the cuto￿. We also record the lottery status (Mega Millions, Powerball,
or neither) of the state in which the tract is located.
13Using these measures of sales, prices, in￿ow ratios, and out￿ow ratios, we estimate re-










where t indexes time, ￿s and ￿t represent state and time ￿xed e￿ects; and ust represents
unobserved determinants of sales in state s in time t.22 The variable ￿AFF
st re￿ects prices for
the a￿liated lottery (e.g., Powerball prices for Powerball states) and ￿RIV
st re￿ects the price
of the rival lottery (e.g., Mega Millions prices for Powerball states). Finally, as motivated
by the theoretical model, ￿IN
st is the in￿ow ratio, as de￿ned above, and ￿OUT
st is the out￿ow
ratio.
Our identi￿cation strategy is thus based upon cross-state di￿erences in the response of
sales to prices. The parameters ￿1 and ￿2 capture the part of the response of sales to
a￿liated and rival prices that is common across all states.23 Similarly, the parameters ￿3
and ￿4 capture any relationships between sales and the spatial distribution of the population
that are independent of variation in prices.24 Finally, the key parameters ￿5 and ￿6
capture di￿erences in the responsiveness of sales to prices according to state population and
the spatial distribution of the population near state borders. In particular, according to
our hypotheses regarding the e￿ect of border density on the relationship between sales and
jackpots, we expect that ￿5 < 0 and ￿6 > 0.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our key measures. As shown, we have a large
sample size, with 22,960 observations, where the unit of observation is the week-state. There
is signi￿cant variation in prices over time, averaging around 83 cents and ranging from
negative to prices that are close to 1. This variation is in turn driven largely by variation in
jackpots, which range in our sample from $2 million to $390 million. There is also signi￿cant
variation in the in￿ow and out￿ow ratios, averaging 0.675 and 0.543 respectively and ranging
from 0 to 6.235 in the case of Washington, D.C. for the 25-kilometer de￿nition. Washington,
D.C. turns out to be a signi￿cant outlier in this dimension with no other states having a
value in excess of 2. Given this, we exclude Washington, D.C. from the baseline analysis but,
as a robustness check, do report results including Washington, D.C. in Table 5.
22 Since states often use di￿erent de￿nitions of a week in the La Fleur’s data, we incorporate monthly,
rather than weekly, time ￿xed e￿ects. Some states may report sales on a Saturday-Friday basis, for example,
whereas others may report sales on a Monday-Sunday basis.
23 In addition to the parameter ￿1 capturing the intensive margin discussed in the theoretical model above,
it also captures the decision to not play the lottery, a margin that was not incorporated into our theoretical
model.
24 For example, if small states with densely populated borders tend to build casinos along borders, then






In this section, we ￿rst provide graphical evidence supporting our main hypothesis. We
then turn to the baseline regression results and present a variety of alternative speci￿cations.
Finally, we provide a policy simulation regarding the change in sales were both Powerball
and Mega Millions tickets to be sold in all states.
We ￿rst provide a graphical analysis that is designed to highlight our identi￿cation
strategy. In particular, Figures 2 and 3 depict the relationship between Powerball sales
in Delaware and Rhode Island, respectively, and prices in the a￿liated game of Powerball
before and after Pennsylvania’s entry into Powerball in 2002. Pennsylvania has a large pop-
ulation located near Delaware’s border: the northern part of Delaware is included in the
de￿nition of the Philadelphia MSA, and the city center of Philadelphia is less than 25 miles
from the Delaware border. Thus, in addition to having a small population, Delaware also
has densely populated border regions.25 The state of Rhode Island also has a small number
of residents and densely populated areas near the border with Massachusetts, a state that
participates in Mega Millions and thus did not enter Powerball during this period. Given
that Rhode Island does not border Pennsylvania, we thus expect sales to be more respon-
sive to prices in Delaware prior to Pennsylvania’s entry into Powerball when compared to a
similar relationship between sales and prices in Rhode Island.
As shown in Figure 2, the relationship between sales and prices was indeed very strong
in Delaware prior to the entry of Pennsylvania into Powerball. After Pennsylvania’s entry,
however, the spikes in sales when jackpots are high remain visible but these spikes are now
much less pronounced. In Rhode Island, by contrast, the relationship between sales and
prices, as depicted in Figure 3, remains fairly stable over this period. Thus, the graphical
evidence supports our key hypothesis regarding the relationship between sales, prices of
a￿liated lotteries, and the size of the population along state borders.
6.1 Baseline Results
Table 3 presents results from our key regressions for border proximity de￿nitions of 25 kilo-
meters, 50 kilometers, and 100 kilometers. As shown in column 1, there is a strong response
of sales to the price of the a￿liated lottery when using the 25 kilometer measure. In par-
ticular, sales fall 230 percent when the price increases from zero to one. As expected, this
e￿ect is stronger in areas with high measures of the in￿ow ratio ￿IN
st : This supports our main
25 Consistent with our hypothesis, lottery o￿cials in Delaware were concerned that Pennsylvania’s entry
into Powerball would severely depress sales of Powerball tickets in Delaware (Philadelphia Inquirer, December
19, 2001).
15hypothesis regarding the relationship between sales and a￿liated prices.
To provide a sense of the quantitative magnitude of these e￿ects, consider a reduction
in the price of the a￿liated lottery of one standard deviation, or 16 cents. In cases with no
border pressure, such as Powerball sales in North Dakota, whose neighbors are all currently
participating in Powerball, sales are predicted to rise by 37 percent. In the opposite extreme,
consider the case of Rhode Island, which has an in￿ow ratio of 1.72. In this case, our model
predicts that sales rise by a signi￿cantly larger 47 percent. Expressed in terms of elasticities,
the a￿liated price elasticity is 2.78 in North Dakota and 3.53 in Rhode Island.26
Returning to column 1, the coe￿cient on the interaction between the price of the rival
lottery and the out￿ow ratio is positive and statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels.
Thus, these results also support the key prediction that the relationship between sales and the
price of the rival lottery is stronger in states with small populations and densely populated
border regions. This e￿ect, however, is somewhat weaker in magnitude than the relationship
between sales and a￿liated prices.
As further evidence regarding the magnitude of these e￿ects, we present results from a
counterfactual experiment in Table 4. Using the membership of states in multi-state games
between June 2006 and December 2008, the ￿nal month of our sample, we predict the fraction
of sales in each state due to cross-border shopping. In particular, we set both the in￿ow and
the out￿ow ratios to zero for each state and predict what sales would have been in the absence
of cross-border shopping. We then compare this to the sales predicted by our baseline model,
and the di￿erence between these two measures over time re￿ects the fraction of sales due to
cross-border shopping. Finally, we average this di￿erence across weeks over the period June
2006-December 2008.
In principle, sales could be higher or lower in the absence of cross-border shopping since
states bene￿t from the in￿ow of the population from nearby states but lose revenues from
the out￿ow of residents to nearby states. As shown in Table 4, however, the former e￿ect
dominates, and sales are higher due to cross-border shopping in all states. While the boost
to sales is small on average, there are signi￿cant di￿erences across states. The increase in
sales due to cross-border shopping is close to zero in large states with sparsely populated
borders, such as California and Texas, and has a maximal value of 9 percent in Rhode Island.
That is, sales in Rhode Island, a state with densely populated borders and a small number
of residents, are 9 percent higher than what they would be in the absence of cross-border
shopping.
26 These elasticities are evaluated at the mean a￿liated price of 83 cents.
166.2 Alternative speci￿cations
Returning to Table 3, column 2 provides results using a somewhat more generous 50 kilometer
border proximity de￿nition. As shown, the key coe￿cients are similar in magnitude. Again,
considering a 16 cent decrease in the price of the a￿liated lottery, Powerball sales in North
Dakota are predicted to rise by 37 percent, whereas in Rhode Island, which at 50 kilometers
has an in￿ow ratio of 3.22, sales are predicted to rise by 46 percent. The similarity of these
predictions to those associated with the results using the 25 kilometer measure suggests that
our results are robust to di￿erent distance measures. Again, the coe￿cient on the interaction
between the price of the other lottery and the out￿ow ratio has the expected positive sign.
The rival price e￿ect is again weaker in magnitude than the a￿liated price e￿ect. Column
3 presents results using a border proximity de￿nition of 100 kilometers, and the coe￿cients
again have the expected signs. Considering the hypothetical 16 cent decrease in the price of
the a￿liated lottery, Powerball sales in North Dakota are predicted to rise by 36 percent,
whereas in Rhode Island, which at 100 kilometers has an in￿ow ratio of 3.49, sales are
predicted to rise by 44 percent.
Comparing across the three speci￿cations in Table 3, the coe￿cient on the price of the
a￿liated lottery is quite stable. The two coe￿cients on the key interactions between prices
and the key ratios, by contrast, have the expected downward pattern. By measuring the
geographic area near the border in a more liberal manner, the fraction of residents in these
areas who are willing to cross the border in order to purchase lottery tickets will necessarily
fall. That is, those within 25 kilometers of the border may be more willing to travel than
those between 50 and 100 kilometers, and this di￿erence would explain the downward pattern
in these key coe￿cients. This also helps to explain why the magnitudes of the changes in
sales associated with the hypothetical one standard deviation price reductions are similar
across the three speci￿cations.
In Table 5, we present results including Washington, D.C., which as noted above, is a
signi￿cant outlier. As shown, the coe￿cients on the key interaction terms are somewhat
weaker in magnitude, and the key coe￿cient on the interaction between the price of the
a￿liated lottery and the in￿ow ratio is now statistically insigni￿cant for the 25 kilometer
measure at conventional levels. The other ￿ve key coe￿cients, however, remain statistically
signi￿cant at conventional levels. Also, the key coe￿cients display the same downward
pattern when moving to more generous border de￿nitions.
Our interpretation of the baseline results in Table 3 is that individuals living near borders
respond to prices when deciding between playing the home-state lottery and crossing the
border and purchasing tickets in neighboring states. An alternative interpretation is that
residents of small states with densely populated border regions, relative to residents of other
17states, are more responsive to prices for reasons unrelated to cross-border shopping. When
prices are low, residents of these small states with densely populated borders may be more
likely, for example, to play the lottery (as opposed to not purchasing any tickets) or to
purchase more tickets.
To address this alternative interpretation, we next provide results from a placebo test in
which we examine border regions between cooperating states. As noted in our theoretical
model, there is no incentive to cross borders between two states participating in the same
multi-state lottery game. Thus, in these cases, we would not expect the size of border
populations, relative to the number of residents, to a￿ect the price responsiveness of sales.
Under the alternative interpretation outlined above, however, we would expect the size of
border populations, relative to the number of residents, to a￿ect the price responsiveness of
sales.
As shown in Table 6, these measures indeed have no explanatory power, as the coe￿cient
on the interaction between the cooperating ratio and the price of the a￿liated lottery is small
and statistically insigni￿cant in all three measures of border regions (within 25 kilometers of
the border, within 50 kilometers, and within 100 kilometers). In addition, after controlling
for these measures of the cooperating ratio, the key coe￿cients on the interactions between
a￿liated prices and the in￿ow ratio and between rival prices and the out￿ow ratio are similar
to those in Table 3. Thus, this placebo test also supports our hypotheses related to cross-
border shopping.
In Table 7, we examine an alternative measure of the attractiveness of lottery games, the
jackpot. Cook and Clotfelter (1993) argue that players may respond more to the jackpot
than to the odds. If players do condition only on the jackpot, then our price measure may
be noisy since it also includes information on odds, which change during our sample period.
Given this, we thus present results using the jackpot as a key explanatory variable. As
shown, we ￿nd that players do respond strongly to the jackpot. A one standard deviation,
or $57 million, increase in the jackpot of the a￿liated lottery is associated with an increase
in sales of 36 percent in North Dakota, and this e￿ect is again much stronger in states with
large in￿ow ratios. In Rhode Island, for example, a one standard deviation, or $57 million,
increase in the lottery is associated with an increase in sales of 50 percent.
We next relax the assumption that non-residents from states with a competing lottery are
as responsive to prices as non-residents from states with neither Powerball nor Mega Millions.
In particular, we separate the in￿ow ratio into two pieces, the competing ratio, which includes
in the numerator only those individuals on both sides of the border with competing games,
and the neither ratio, which includes in the numerator only those individuals on the foreign
side of the border with states participating in neither Powerball nor Mega Millions. Note
18that the competing ratio is identical to our de￿nition of the out￿ow ratio since the latter
also excludes borders with neighboring states that have neither Powerball nor Mega Millions.
As shown in Table 8, the coe￿cients on the interactions between the competing ratio and
the price of the a￿liated lottery and between the competing ratio and the price of the
rival lottery are similar to the corresponding coe￿cients in Table 3. The coe￿cient on the
interaction between the neither ratio and the price of the a￿liated lottery, by contrast, is
much larger in magnitude than the coe￿cient on the competing ratio. Thus, residents from
states that participate in neither Powerball nor Mega Millions but who live close to borders
of participating states are quite responsive to prices. Again, all three sets of coe￿cients are
decreasing in magnitude as the de￿nition of distance increases.
Finally, in Table 9, we present results using a linear, rather than logarithmic, measure
of sales per capita. As shown, the coe￿cients on the price of the a￿liated lottery and
its interaction with the in￿ow ratio have the expected negative signs. The coe￿cient on
the interaction between the price of the rival lottery and the out￿ow ratio, however, has
the expected positive sign only in column 1 and is statistically insigni￿cant across all three
speci￿cations.
6.3 Policy simulation
As noted above, these two key multi-state games, Powerball and Mega Millions, are expected
to begin cross-selling their products in 2010, and we next use our analysis to predict the level
of sales under this counterfactual scenario. Sales in our theoretical model have a simple form
in this case since consumers would have no incentive to cross borders in order to purchase
tickets. In particular, the two games become perfect substitutes, and players thus purchase
tickets from the game with the lower price. Under the assumption that these tickets are
available in all ￿fty states, sales, in the context of our empirical speci￿cation, are predicted
to have the following form:
ln(rst) = ￿1 min(￿RIV
st ;￿AFF
st ) + ￿s + ￿t + ust
There are two o￿setting e￿ects associated with this change, and thus sales could either
increase or decrease following the cross-selling arrangement. On the one hand, state revenues
will increase due to the fact that residents can choose to purchase tickets from the game with
lower prices. On the other hand, state revenues will tend to fall, since, as shown in Table
4, cross-border shopping tends to increase sales in all states, and, as noted above, the cross-
selling of Powerball and Mega Millions tickets will eliminate incentives to cross borders in
order to purchase lottery tickets.
19As shown in Table 10, the former e￿ect dominates as we predict that sales would rise by
a large percentage in all states. The variation in this increase is signi￿cant, ranging from 10
percent in Delaware and 11 percent in Rhode Island to 21 percent in Michigan. The lower
predicted increases in these small densely populated states re￿ect the fact that both games
were already more easily accessible in these states and their bordering states since travel
distances are relatively short. Thus, having both sets of tickets sold in every state represents
a less dramatic change in these states.
There are two important caveats associated with this policy simulation. First, our analy-
sis does not account for the fact that multiple winners would be more common in this
counterfactual scenario since sales would be signi￿cantly boosted. Increased prevalence of
multiple winners would tend to increase prices and, if players account for multiple winners
when making lottery choices, thus dampen these predicted increases in sales. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, our analysis assumes that jackpots would be unchanged over this
period. With all players purchasing tickets for the game with the lower price, one jackpot
would tend to rise briskly until a winning ticket is purchased. The other jackpot, by con-
trast, would remain at low levels during this period. Given this, our results can best be
interpreted as the short-run e￿ects associated with the cross-selling of Powerball and Mega
Millions tickets. An investigation of the long-run e￿ects of this agreement would require a
simulation of the dynamics of jackpots in this counterfactual scenario.
7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated competition between state lotteries with a speci￿c focus on com-
petitive forces associated with cross-border shopping. Our theoretical model predicts, and
the empirical analysis con￿rms, that if cross-border shopping is signi￿cant, the relationship
between sales and prices should be stronger in states with small populations and densely
populated border regions. The magnitude of the estimated e￿ects is large in general, sug-
gesting that states do face signi￿cant competitive pressures from neighboring states. The
e￿ects also vary signi￿cantly across regions, with much stronger e￿ects in small states with
densely populated border regions.
The ￿ndings have important implications for the recent agreement to sell Powerball and
Mega Millions tickets in the 42 states currently selling tickets for one of the two games.
First, subject to the two important caveats discussed above, our policy simulations suggest
that sales in all states will rise signi￿cantly following this cross-selling since consumers have
access to a greater variety of products. Second, our ￿ndings suggest that this cooperation may
reduce the competitive pressures facing states since consumers will no longer have incentives
20to cross borders in order to purchase tickets. If states respond to these competitive pressures
when setting prices, as documented by Brown and Rork (2005), this agreement may lead to
even higher prices and lower payout rates for consumers.
These ￿ndings also have broader implications for state taxation of lottery tickets and
related products. The ￿ndings are consistent with the view that consumers have a limited
budget for gambling, and the o￿ering of new products may reduce sales of related products.
In particular, the introduction of lotteries in new states may reduce sales in neighboring
states. Under the additional assumption that these results apply to other forms of gambling,
the introduction of new casinos, which have been recently proposed in many cash-strapped
states, may reduce casino revenues in neighboring states or even reduce lottery sales within
the state borders.
Even more generally, our results have important implications for the taxation of other
products with low transportation costs and signi￿cant variation in tax burdens across states.
As noted in the literature review, this set of products includes gasoline, cigarettes, and
alcohol. In these cases, our analysis suggests that tax bases are linked across states and thus
changes in tax rates in one state may a￿ect tax revenues in neighboring states.
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Table 1: Date of Entry into Powerball (P) and Mega Millions (M) by StateVariable Distance (km) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(salespc) 22960 ‐1.042 0.606 ‐3.970 3.135
affiliated price 22960 0.827 0.157 ‐0.768 0.995
rival price 22960 0.827 0.180 ‐0.768 1.000
inflow ratio 25 22960 0.675 1.118 0.000 6.235
inflow ratio 50 22960 1.324 1.959 0.000 9.474
inflow ratio 100 22960 1.872 2.540 0.000 12.383
outflow ratio 25 22960 0.543 1.063 0.000 6.235
outflow ratio 50 22960 0.986 1.717 0.000 9.474
outflow ratio 100 22960 1.277 1.975 0.000 11.507
cooperating ratio 25 22960 0.271 0.314 0.000 1.653
cooperating ratio 50 22960 0.444 0.578 0.000 4.147
cooperating ratio 100 22960 0.789 0.992 0.000 7.216
competing ratio 25 22960 0.543 1.063 0.000 6.235
competing ratio 50 22960 0.986 1.717 0.000 9.474
competing ratio 100 22960 1.277 1.975 0.000 11.507
neither ratio 25 22960 0.132 0.419 0.000 5.235
neither ratio 50 22960 0.338 1.000 0.000 8.474
neither ratio 100 22960 0.595 1.593 0.000 11.383
affiliated jackpot (b) 22960 57.593 56.802 2.000 390.000








VARIABLES (dist=25km) (dist=50km) (dist=100km)
affiliated price ‐2.298*** ‐2.303*** ‐2.280***
[0.073] [0.062] [0.059]
rival price ‐0.037*** ‐0.029** ‐0.031**
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
inflow ratio 0.433*** 0.199*** 0.140***
[0.137] [0.029] [0.016]
outflow ratio ‐0.125* ‐0.032 ‐0.028
[0.067] [0.020] [0.018]
affiliated price*inflow ratio ‐0.368*** ‐0.177*** ‐0.135***
[0.100] [0.034] [0.017]
rival price*outflow ratio 0.055*** 0.019** 0.015**
[0.013] [0.007] [0.006]
month by year fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 22231 22231 22231





by the number of residents.state Δsalespc state Δsalespc
AZ 0.76% NC 0.64%
CA 0.23% ND 0.00%
CO 0.23% NE 0.11%
CT 6.02% NH 6.13%
DE 7.78% NJ 3.75%
GA 2.12% NM 1.99%
IA 1.14% NY 1.18%
ID 2.02% OH 1.83%
IL 3.32% OK 1.73%
IN 4.20% OR 2.93%
KS 0.00% PA 3.91%
KY 2.51% RI 8.54%
LA 1.55% SC 1.56%
MA 3.69% SD 0.10%
MD 3.85% TX 0.47%
ME 0.00% VA 2.67%
MI 0.48% VT 4.69%
MN 0.00% WA 2.01%
MO 3.05% WI 1.28%
MT 0.31% WV 4.93%
Note: Sample excludes DC, calculations for 25km distance.
Table 4:  Percent change in sales per capita from border shoppingln(salespc) ln(salespc) ln(salespc)
VARIABLES (dist=25km) (dist=50km) (dist=100km)
affiliated price ‐2.431*** ‐2.386*** ‐2.347***
[0.065] [0.069] [0.072]
rival price ‐0.030*** ‐0.029*** ‐0.031***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010]
inflow ratio 0.190* 0.124*** 0.099***
[0.099] [0.038] [0.028]
outflow ratio ‐0.091*** ‐0.037*** ‐0.027**
[0.023] [0.014] [0.010]
affiliated price*inflow ratio ‐0.093 ‐0.086* ‐0.084**
[0.068] [0.048] [0.036]
rival price*outflow ratio 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.013***
[0.008] [0.004] [0.003]
month by year fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations (includes DC) 22960 22960 22960





VARIABLES (dist=25km) (dist=50km) (dist=100km)
affiliated price ‐2.307*** ‐2.305*** ‐2.294***
[0.073] [0.062] [0.065]
rival price ‐0.037*** ‐0.029** ‐0.033***
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
inflow ratio 0.533** 0.151 0.037
[0.201] [0.097] [0.063]
outflow ratio ‐0.171 ‐0.025 ‐0.037***
[0.104] [0.024] [0.013]
cooperating ratio 0.060 ‐0.066 ‐0.162*
[0.311] [0.150] [0.092]
affiliated price*inflow ratio ‐0.372*** ‐0.176*** ‐0.133***
[0.102] [0.034] [0.017]
rival price*outflow ratio 0.054*** 0.019*** 0.017***
[0.012] [0.007] [0.006]
affiliated price*cooperating ratio 0.043 0.004 0.016
[0.161] [0.047] [0.026]
month by year fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: Sample excludes DC 22231 22231 22231







VARIABLES (dist=25km) (dist=50km) (dist=100km)
affiliated jackpot 6.446*** 6.503*** 6.311***
[0.268] [0.240] [0.224]
rival jackpot 0.033 ‐0.029 ‐0.018
[0.092] [0.083] [0.092]
inflow ratio 0.094 0.028* 0.006
[0.061] [0.016] [0.007]
outflow ratio ‐0.086 ‐0.020 ‐0.019
[0.052] [0.014] [0.013]
affiliated jackpot*inflow ratio 1.414*** 0.640*** 0.585***
[0.429] [0.187] [0.110]
rival jackpot*outflow ratio ‐0.277* ‐0.069 ‐0.059
[0.164] [0.081] [0.069]
month by year fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 22231 22231 22231






VARIABLES (dist=25km) (dist=50km) (dist=100km)
affiliated price ‐2.315*** ‐2.330*** ‐2.318***
[0.030] [0.029] [0.030]
rival price ‐0.039*** ‐0.029*** ‐0.030***
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
competing ratio 0.197*** 0.099*** 0.060***
[0.038] [0.013] [0.012]
neither ratio 0.681*** 0.321*** 0.191***
[0.139] [0.024] [0.013]
affiliated price*competing ratio ‐0.248*** ‐0.097*** ‐0.074***
[0.039] [0.015] [0.013]
rival price*competing ratio 0.054*** 0.018*** 0.015***
[0.015] [0.006] [0.005]
affiliated price*neither ratio ‐0.671*** ‐0.321*** ‐0.195***
[0.162] [0.028] [0.015]
month by year fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 22231 22231 22231





VARIABLES (dist=25km) (dist=50km) (dist=100km)
affiliated price ‐0.802*** ‐0.976*** ‐0.840***
[0.254] [0.237] [0.184]
rival price ‐0.109*** ‐0.091*** ‐0.086***
[0.031] [0.025] [0.022]
inflow ratio 2.206*** 0.920*** 0.695***
[0.556] [0.259] [0.131]
outflow ratio ‐0.171** ‐0.067** ‐0.055***
[0.074] [0.027] [0.020]
affiliated price*inflow ratio ‐2.392*** ‐1.007*** ‐0.773***
[0.581] [0.302] [0.152]
rival price*outflow ratio 0.005 ‐0.008 ‐0.013
[0.022] [0.008] [0.010]
month by year fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 22231 22231 22231





divided by the number of residents.state Δsalespc state Δsalespc
AZ 18.71% NC 18.82%
CA 18.39% ND 19.85%
CO 19.23% NE 19.35%
CT 13.45% NH 13.33%
DE 9.57% NJ 15.32%
GA 16.51% NM 17.47%
IA 18.32% NY 17.44%
ID 17.44% OH 16.79%
IL 18.17% OK 17.73%
IN 15.26% OR 16.53%
KS 19.46% PA 13.44%
KY 16.95% RI 10.92%
LA 17.91% SC 15.80%
MA 14.94% SD 17.81%
MD 17.65% TX 18.15%
ME 19.46% VA 15.96%
MI 21.01% VT 14.77%
MN 17.35% WA 16.61%
MO 16.42% WI 18.19%
MT 19.65% WV 14.54%
Note: Sample excludes DC, calculations for 25km distance.
Table 10: Predicted percent change in sales from Powerball/Mega Millions cross‐selling